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LEGITIMISING THE ILLEGITIMATE : EXTENDING
INTERPRETATION BEYOND REALITY. THE
SHRIMP FAIRYTALE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
Mervyn Martin *
Abstract
The challenges of liberalization of international trade; Firstly was the realization that in the past
there was a tendency to be satisfied with sweeping, unspecific statements on best principles, which
always led to often a meaningless outcome without hard and fast commitments. The second was their
episodic character. The notion of dispute settlement involves conflicting assertions as to the rights and
obligations of the parties involved. Disputes arise from freely entered relationships between parties
that create expectations as to their future conduct. there existed a three-pronged objective of the
negotiating plan indicated from the Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement for the UR negotiating
process. The use of interpretory aids may become necessary when there is ambiguity in the text of
the agreement. The observations indicate that that the Trade Stakeholder model is flawed in some
agreement and the increasing influence of this model can be seen from an observation of similar-type
cases over the years. Consistency on attempts to manipulate negotiated rights and obligation through
“extended” approach became clear in Shrimp. Current slant of DSC decisions should continue to be
applied.
Keywords: agreement, interpretation, dispute settlement, solution.

I. INTRODUCTION
We live in an ever globalizing world. With greater integration as a
result of globalization it is vital that the international trading system
provides a platform that sufficiently supports the ability of all players to
benefit from globalization.1 This platform is referred to as the multilateral trading system which, through the World Trade organization provides a series of agreements that seek to regulate international trading
activity. The current agreements were negotiated over a period spanning more than a decade, and therefore has to be appreciated within the
context of which compromise and agreement were arrived upon. This
is especially true as the previous platform, the GATT 1947 is said to
* Author is a Lecturer of International Law at Universitas Brawijaya. He obtained his
Bachelor of Law and Master of Law from Universitas Brawijaya. He can be reached
at setiawanwicaksono@ub.ac.id.
1
M.Martin, “WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding and Development”, Nijhoff
International Trade Law Series, 2013
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have become obsolete as it failed to accommodate developments within
the international trading system. Therefore, there are a number of matters that must be weighed when seeking to appreciate the context upon
which the foundations that this regulatory system was built upon.
The notion of international trade integration is often referred to as
free trade.2 Although not a hundred percent linguistically accurate as
even free trade as a policy concept contains some restriction,3 free trade
basically means the elimination of all artificial/protective trade barriers
to the exchange of products across national markets. The idea is that
prices faced by producers and consumers will be determined by the
world market, reflected by the availability of such goods.4 Indeed, some
early free trade writers viewed the world market as one unit, and the
quest for benefit and advantage was seen as a mutual endeavor throughout the world.5 Much of the underlying considerations and objectives of
the free trade approach relate to concepts of efficiency in production, a
large market base and that market barriers lead to inefficiencies.6
According to trade theorists,7 the basic/pure theory of trade is concerned with answering two sets of questions. First, why and how countries
gain from trade. Second, is to explain the pattern of that trade, basically
meaning why certain countries export some goods, and import others.8
The first set is called welfare economics, while the second set is called
positive economics. Welfare economics is primarily concerned with the
effects of trade on real income, total satisfaction, welfare and develop2

Ibid.
Examples include national security, protection of public morals, food safety and the
contentious development policy vehicles such as infant industry protection and local
content requirement
4
D. Irwin, Against the Tide : an intellectual history of free trade, Princeton University
Press, 1996. P. 5
5
D. Irwin, ibid, at p. 60, referencing the work of Jacob Vanderlint, 1734.
6
Irwin, ibid, p. 87. The consolidation of the case for free trade through the theory of
comparative advantage was developed by the classical economists in the 19th Century
following through from Adam Smith’s ideas.
7
A. Smith, The Wealth of Nations, New York: Modern Library, 1994 [1776] and D.
Ricardo, On the Principles of Political Economy, and Taxation, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971 (Originally published 1817)
8
N. Grimwade, International Trade; New Patterns of Trade, Production and Investment, 2nd Edition, Routledge, 2000, p. 29-30
3
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ment. Positive economics involves considerations that are non-monetary,
and focuses on the structure, volume and direction of trade: focusing on
the efficiency in production and between factors of production.
According to a prominent Classical trade theorist, Adam Smith,
trade is a basic manifestation of human nature through the propensity to
trade, barter and exchange one thing for another.9 To substantiate such
an assertion, Smith submitted that instead of attempting to produce all
products that they were able to, a country should focus on producing
products where they enjoyed a cost advantage over other countries. By
doing so, their resources would be concentrated on specialization in
producing such goods leading to greater efficiency and higher output.
Smith also advocated for a large market base, stating that this would
lead to wealth creation. To achieve this trade should be impediment
free. Hence countries could then trade their surplus resulting in higher
output from greater efficiency, at lower prices, based on the requisite
terms of trade. The bigger the market base for trade the greater the
wealth creation and satisfaction leading to welfare and development
enhancement resulting from specialized production and trade. Smith’s
theory has been criticized for placing too much emphasis on absolute
costs differences. However a number of subsequent theorists support
the basic idea of specialization and large, impediment free market.10
Although mankind have been actively involved in cross border exchange of goods from the beginning of recorded history,11 the full impact of trade theory in practice can be appreciated from attitudes taken
by major economies through their international trade policy practices in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.12 As a result of this
A. Smith, supra note 7, p. 14
See J. S Mill, Principles of Political Economy [1884]. Ed. W.J Ashley London,
1909. See M. Trebilcock and R. Howse, The Regulation of International Trade, 3rd
edition, Routledge, 2005, p. 5, for example David Ricardo, the Heckcher-Ohlin Theorem through the Factor Proportions Hypothesis and Raymond Vernon of the Harvard
Business School through his Product Cycle Theory..
11
S. Kemp, “Psychology and Opposition to Free Trade”, World Trade Review, Volume 6:1, 2007, 25-44, p. 27
See also R. Horan, E. Bulte, and J. Shogren, “How Trade Saved Humanity from Biological Extinction : An Economic Theory of Neanderthal Extinction” Journal of Economic behavior and Organization, 58 (1) 1-29
12
M. Trebilcock and R. Howse, supra note 10, p. 21
9

10
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long relationship between man and the need to trade, it is expected that
through such activity, customary practices developed including the notion of fair exchange and fair distribution arising from such activity.13
The influence of free trade precepts are connected to the quest for larger
market bases, which led to greater unification of markets. As a result,
barriers within domestic markets fell. This inevitably led to the practice
of free trade being taken into a wider context as countries practiced
such principles when trading across national borders. The repealing of
the Corn Laws in 1846 which has been attributed in part to the influence
of Smith and Ricardo, was followed by unilateral liberalization in Britain. Many other major European economies like France and Germany
followed suit and as a result, these major economies negotiated trade
liberalizing treaties between them. Contained within these treaties was
the most favored nation (MFN) principle which in essence meant that
they would extend to each other any more favorable concessions that
each might subsequently negotiate with third countries,14 or in other
words automatic reciprocity. This reinforced the environment for free
trade and reciprocity and the importance of creating and maintaining a
greater market base to this end. This move significantly contributed to
multilateralism with the spread of standard provisions and treatment.
These treaties also had a knock-on effect which led to the adoption
of conventions to support the objectives of trade liberalising treaties
especially in relation to transport and communication which further facilitated trade expansion.15 Hence, the regulation of international trade
requires a system that ensures automatic reciprocity as well as one that
is rule based rather than power based, supported by a fair and effective
dispute settlement mechanism.
Between the two world wars, conferences/discussions were undertaken on the challenges of liberalization of international trade.16. It
R. Trivers, The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism” Quarterly Review of Biology,
Vol 46 (1) 35-57, March 1971, p. 37 available at JOSTOR http://jstor.org, accessed on
26/5/07 at 3.30 pm
14
See discussion by R. Spaulding Jr, “German Trade Policy in Eastern Europe,
1890-1990: preconditions for Applying International Trade Leverage” International
Organization, Vol 45, N0. 3 (summer 1991)pp. 343-368, p. 349 and also M. Trebilcock
and R. Howse, supra note 10, p. 21
15
M. Trebilcock and R. Howse, supra note 10, p. 21
16
Robert E Hudec, The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy, Butterworth
13
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is claimed that two aspects of the interwar conferences were of great
value to international economic law. Firstly was the realization that in
the past there was a tendency to be satisfied with sweeping, unspecific
statements on best principles, which always led to often a meaningless
outcome without hard and fast commitments. The second was their episodic character.17 These can be grouped as gaining an insight from past
mistakes where agreements of a vague nature did not serve to attain the
requirements of the trading environment of the day. What was required
was a rule-based system with clear certain rules supported by an effective dispute settlement mechanism.18 Further, without any long term
framework, it was easy for trading partners to slip back to mercantilist
based policies.19
Subsequent international conferences provided trade officials from
major trading nations the opportunity to do exactly this, which eventually resulted in the commissioning of draft texts dealing with the main
trade restrictive issues of the time. The drafting exercises allowed officials the opportunity to re-examine problematic issues previously circumvented by the unspecific wordings in earlier initiatives, and more
importantly, to clarify what indeed such ambiguity meant. 20 This motivation led to the crafting of the International Trade organization (ITO),
which was an ambitious initiative said to have been capable of producing the platform that would have addressed all these concerns. However, the resulting reluctance by the major players of the time to commit
to such far reaching reforms in the international system led to the ITO’s
failure. Instead the GATT 1047 which was meant to be only one component of the ITO survived as the multilateral trading system regulatory
platform for the following five decades, before it was replaced. Over
the course of fifty or so years, underlying philosophies of regulation
changed. The GATT 1947 focused on negative harmonization which is
eliminating discrimination. During the run up to the conclusion of the
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, focus moved to a
Legal Publishers, Second Edition, 1990, p. 5.
17
Robert E Hudec, ibid, p. 7
18
M.Martin, supra note 1
19
J. Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order”, International Organization, Vol 36, No. 2
International regimes, (Spring 1982), pp 379-415, p. 384
20
Robert E Hudec, supra note 16, p. 8
225
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new philosophy for the regulation of international trade, namely positive harmonization, towards harmonization of national policies.21 Some
authors indicate that such harmonization involves the trading of trade
policies.22 What is evident in relation to harmonization however is that
the degree of harmonization needed to be stepped up. In fact towards
the end of the GATT’s life, the Tokyo Round of negotiations actually
split the diverse membership of the GATT, indicating that the GATT as
a regulatory platform could no longer sustain the multilateral trading
system. Times had changed. There were new players in the international trading system, and the international trading environment provided
for new opportunities, which really required the inclusion of these new
players who mostly were developing countries. The result was the establishment of the World Trade organization (WTO) in 1995.
Much of the discontentment with the regulatory base under the
GATT 1947 was expected to be abated with the conclusion of the UR
which brought some important developments. Firstly was the single undertaking commitment which unified the coverage of the agreements.
This rectified the splitting and segregation of members.23 The WTO also
created a framework for liberalization of trade in services, protection
of intellectual property rights and very importantly, formalized and improved dispute settlement.
The notion of dispute settlement involves conflicting assertions as
to the rights and obligations of the parties involved.24 A legal dispute
refers to conflicts of rights between parties within the jurisdiction of a
dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) but does not involve conflicts of
interests of the parties.25 Therefore one may conclude that it is the rights
21

V. Heiskanen, “The Regulatory Philosophy of International Trade Law”, Journal
of World Trade, 38 (1), 1-36, 2004, p. 29
22
B. Hoekman and M. Kostecki, The Political Economy of the World Trading System,
The WTO and Beyond, 2nd Edition, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 27
23
Hans van Houtte, The Law of International Trade, 2nd edition, London Sweet and
Maxwell, 2002,
p. 77
24
P. Behrens, “Adjudicative Methods of Dispute Settlement in International Economic Relations”, in E. Petersmann and G. Jaenicke, Adjudication of International
Trade Disputes in International and National Economic Law, PUPIL volume 7, D.
Dickie (ed), University Press, Fribourg Switzerland, 1992, p. 5
25
Article 25 of the ICSID Convention on Settlement of Investment Disputes Between
Volume 13 Number 2 January 2016
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and obligations that are covered in the agreements through which the
dispute is raised is of prime importance in a dispute settlement proceeding. Disputes arise from freely entered relationships between parties
that create expectations as to their future conduct. Such expectations
are upon what parties plan their future conduct. Such a conclusion in
turn gives rise to two situations. Firstly, conflict of interests should have
been resolved before binding obligations were entered into, as, to allow conflicting interests subsequent to reaching a negotiated compromise would make the DSM redundant, and secondly, rights and obligations of parties’ under the DSM cannot be extended without the parties’
agreement. It is submitted that in the context of a multilateral agreement
the magnitude of the WTO, such extension would entail proper negotiations where the benefits of the proposed wider coverage would be
weighed against national policies/interests before further binding obligations are entered into.
When parties negotiated the Uruguay Round Agreements, including the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), they intended
a rule-oriented system. The pre-UR power-oriented system, premised
on the use of ones party’s dominance/power to influence the conduct of
the other party, has been criticised as having the aim of redistributing
income to the benefit of the powerful26 and not satisfying the balanced
development requirements resulting from the evolution of the international system in general. The rule-oriented approach is instead based on
free negotiation.27 This notion of free negotiation was necessary as the
multilateral trading system grew in scope and character, creating new
problems in international economic relations resulting from a congruence of circumstances.28 To meet the measure of discipline that was reStates and Nationals of Other States, 1965. ICSID Doc. R 65-6, para.25 (8 January
1965) available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc-archive/17.htm, at 5.10
pm on 20 July 2004.
26
See E. Petersmann, “The GATT Dispute Settlement and the Uruguay Negotiations
on its Reform”, in P. Sarcevic and H. van Houtte (eds), Legal Issues in International
Trade, Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1990, pp. 55-57 for discussion.
27
Ibid, p. 56.
28
J. Jackson, The World Trade Organization, Constitution and Jurisprudence, The
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998, p. 13. See also D. Mc. Rea”What is the
Future of WTO Dispute Settlement” Journal of International Economic Law 7(1)
3-21, Oxford University Press 2004, p. 3. Examples of such congruence were dis227
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quired for national governments to take initiatives to attain the desired
integration, a check on the ability of national governments to backslide
on their commitments was necessary. 29 Some authors have recognised
that the nature of binding decisions of the rule-oriented approach is a
basis for long-term obligations based on mutual agreement, and that
this approach would avoid the risks of over dependence on diplomatic
solutions that would inevitably reflect the relative power of the parties,30
especially in a forum with such a diverse membership as the WTO. The
function of multilateral trade rules as described by some authors is to
maximise welfare and this is achieved through a rule-oriented settlement of such disputes.31 Hence, the final outcome of dispute settlement
negotiations in the UR was a rule-oriented approach evidenced by the
adjudicative features of the system,32 as an attractive and transparent
alternative to unilateral measures and a system that could protect the
contractual rights of all members including developing nations.33
A degree of consultations was included into the dispute settlement
process, as some authors state34 providing for both diplomatic and legal means of addressing the issue at hand, therefore maximizing the
chances of settlement by successive or alternative use of different methods. This view on the surface would seem to describe the WTO DSU.
However, in viewing the decision to negotiate for improving the dispute
settlement at the UR, and in appreciation of the prevailing situation of
dispute settlement at that time and the deficiencies that a new DSU was
meant to rectify, together with the clear subdivision between the conciliatory/consultative and actual panel/adjudicatory process, the view
of there being alternative processes is criticized as inaccurate. Consultations required by Article 4 of the DSU are undertaken as part of the
entire dispute settlement process. It should be viewed as being sequential in nature. Engaging in consultation is without prejudice to the right
cussed in chapter 1 of this paper.
29
J. Jackson, ibid, p. 24
30
E. Petersmann, supra note 26, p. 59
31
J. Jackson, supra note 28 p. 57
32
This includes the panel process, independence, written exchange between parties
and the time limits. See discussion at E. Petersmann, supra note 26, p. 64
33
J. Brewer and S. Young, “WTO Disputes and Developing Countries”, Journal of
World Trade 33 (5) 169-182, 1999, p. 172.
34
E. Petersmann, supra note 26, p. 57
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of any party to proceed with requesting the establishment of a panel
should an amicable solution not be reached.
A reading of the dispute settlement-negotiating plan of the Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement for the UR negotiating process,35
indicates that there existed a three-pronged objective of the negotiating plan. These were, firstly that there was acceptance that greater effectiveness and enforceability of rights and obligations under GATT
rules was beneficial to all members, and therefore desired. Secondly,
to achieve this, the rules and procedures relating to dispute settlement
needed to be strengthened with the ultimate view of, the third objective,
the attainment of an effective and efficient method of resolving disputes
arising from the covered agreements. The resulting large number of
proposals submitted for this exercise36 indicated that there was a high
degree of interest across the board to achieve the goals identified in the
agreed negotiating plan.
However, developing countries have expressed concern over the interpretation and application of the WTO Agreements.37 The accumulated jurisprudence of the WTO dispute settlement system thus far reveals
that the interest and perceptions of developing countries have not been
adequately taken into account. The Panels and Appellate Bodies have
displayed an excessive concern for legalism.38
Some authors are of the opinion that the Appellate Body prefers
the literal approach to interpretation.39 This form of interpretation is
criticized in that it stops any examination of the intention of the parties
35

This Negotiating Group being part of the Uruguay Round negotiating process
which consisted of 14 such individual groups reporting to the central Trade Negotiations Committee.
36
E. Petersmann, “Settlement of International and National Trade Disputes Through
the GATT:The Case of Antidumping Law”, in E. Petersmann and G. Jaenicke, Adjudication of International Trade Disputes in International and National Economic Law,
PUPIL volume 7, D. Dickie (ed), University Press, Fribourg Switzerland, 1992, p. 55
37
A. Qureshi, “Interpreting World Trade Organisation Agreements for the Development Objective” Journal of World Trade 37 (5) 847-882, 2003, p. 848
38
Zambia on behalf of the LDC Group, (TN/DS/W/17) 9 October 2002
39
C. Ehlermann, ““Six Years on the Bench of the World Trade Court”. Some Personal
Experiences as a Member of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organisation”,
Journal of World Trade , 36 (4) 2002, 605-639, p
229
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or objects and purpose of the agreement.40 Therefore, there cannot be
security and predictability where the intention of parties expressed in
the objectives and purpose of the agreement are being diluted. Other
authors find that interpretation of WTO Agreements should be based
on the fact that there is an overall balance of concessions in the WTO.41
The issue with interpretation of the DSU itself as well as the covered agreements by Panels and the Appellate Body can best be appreciated through what this paper seeks to introduce as the “extended” approach.42 When Members decided to replace the power-based approach
of relationships between themselves to a more rule-based approach, the
value of negotiations and discussion between Members were not under-preserved. The nature of international/multilateral trade requires an
avenue to propose, discuss and exchange technical know-how of new
issues before binding obligations are undertaken. However, the diversity of interests between Members and caution especially amongst developing countries has meant that the work progress for the acceptance
of expansion of regulatory coverage by developing countries has been
slow. This has caused a degree of frustration amongst some developed
countries causing them to increasingly require the covered agreements
to be interpreted to extract the intentions of the parties of the agreements during dispute settlement as a means of “smuggling in” new,
especially non-trade issues into the DSU,43 thereby adjusting the parameters or extent of consent to be bound, and displacing the intended
A. Qureshi,supra note 37, p 866. See also A. Chua, “Reasonable Expectations and
non-Violation Complaints in GATT/WTO Jurisprudence”, Journal of World Trade 32
(2) 27-50, 1998, for a discussion on the principle of reasonable expectations and subsequent assumptions as a result.
41
G. Marceau, “WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights” 13 E.J.I.L 4 (2002)
753-841
42
As opposed to the rule-based and power-based approaches discussed above. See
discussion in D. Shanker “The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties , the Dispute
Settlement System of the WTO and the Doha declaration on the TRIPS Agreement”
Journal of World Trade 36 (4) 721-772, 2002 on how the over use of interpretation
under the Vienna convention can undermine the WTO DSU.
43
According to D. Mc. Rea supra note 28, , p. 3, there is practice of Members to use
dispute settlement to gain further clarification of provisions in order to expand the
scope of existing obligations to encompass matters which no negotiating progress has
been made.
40
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rule-based system.44 The dangers of such an approach have been recognized earlier by some authors,45 although others have been inclined to
assert that such an approach is judicial activism by the appellate body.46
This is criticized as such interpretation is as a result of certain Members
persistently requiring interpretation of the covered agreements that has
brought about this phenomenon. Some authors observe that these are
attempts to use the dispute settlement process to pursue matters that
they are unable to win in negotiations despite Article 3 (2) DSU that the
DSB cannot add or diminish rights and obligations provided under the
covered agreements.47
Connected to the “extended” approach is the Trade Stakeholder
model.48 This model is premised on the pursuance of interests of certain
segments of stakeholders or pressure groups in a Member’s economy.49
44

Accordingly, .J. Weiler in “The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats”,
Journal of World Trade 35 (2) 191-207, 2001, p. 194 asks the question if the shift in
paradigm in relation to the WTO DSU has been a victory for the rule of law or a victory for the rule of lawyers, asserting that such developments have not benefited the
deeper objectives of the WTO. M. Dunne, “Redefining Power Orientation : A Reassessment of Jackson’s paradigm in Light of Asymmetries of Power, Negotiation and
Compliance in the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System”, 34 Law and Policy in
International Business 277, Fall 2002, p. 280 suggests the need to reconsider the traditional understanding of the realist perspective of “power-based” to a new contextual
understanding that is not static in its approach to the meaning of “power-based”. D.
Shanker supra note 42, discusses how the interpretative approach is now influencing
the WTO negotiating agenda.
45
C. Ehlermann, “Six Years on the Bench of the World Trade Court”. Some Personal
Experiences as a Member of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organisation”,
Journal of World Trade , 36 (4) 2002, 605-639, at p. 605
46
R. Steinburg, “Judicial Law making at the WTO : Discursive, Constitutional and
Political Constraints”, 98 American Journal International Law 247, April 2004. See
also E. Vermulst, P. Mavroidis and P. Waer, “The Functioning of the Appellate Body
After Four Years : Towards Rule Integrity”, Journal of World Trade, 33 (2), 1-50,
1999, p. 23
47
T. Stewart, P. McDonough and M. Prado, “Opportunities for Increased Liberalisation of Goods “ Making Sure Rules Work for All and That Special Needs Are Addressed”, 24 Fordham International Law Journal 652, Nov/Dec 2000, p. 672
48
M. Trebilcock and R. Howse, The Regulation of International Trade, 2nd Edition
Routledge, 1999 p. 55 are very much in favour of this model
49
J. Schultz, “The Demise of “Green” Protectionism : the WTO Decision on US Gasoline Rule” 25 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 1, Fall 1996, provides
a discussion and illustration of such a model is used by pressure groups to overcome
231
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The naive rational of this model50 does not consider that to permit the
infiltration of such a model into the WTO DSU would be legitimizing
public choice policies.51 Within an administration, a government has
to weigh the interests of all its stakeholders. It is very often that the
many stakeholders in one country would have conflicting interests. If
the interest of one segment of stakeholders is pursued to the detriment
of another, the rational given by such authors for the importance of this
model holds very little water. In pursuing an international agreement,
such interests should have been weighed domestically and exercised
through a member’s foreign policy. The use of interpretative strategies
to mound or manipulate the outcome of a prior agreement cannot logically be calibrated with the intentions of parties at the time of negotiations.52 The use of the extended approach to satisfy the trade stakeholder
model goes against the grain of dispute settlement in general which is to
provide security and predictability to the covered agreements.
The use of interpretory aids may become necessary when there is
ambiguity in the text of the agreement.53 Accordingly, there must be
good reason to doubt the natural sense of the words used in the treaty.54 It is submitted that the opinion of a segment of the population of
a Member will not satisfy this test. As a government is charged to balance the interests of all its stakeholders before undertaking binding
commitments internationally, a dissatisfied group, notwithstanding an
appreciation of the degree of influence such a group may have on the
the competitive edge of foreign exporters and operates as a non-tariff barrier.
50
Especially explained and applied by M. Trebilcock and R. Howse, supra note 48,
in Chapter 3
51
E. Icobucci, “The Interdependence of Trade and Competition Policies”, 21 (2)
World Competition 1997, p. 12 for a discussion on the ill effects of public choice policies which according to him will negatively impact on global welfare.
52
According to L. Bartels in “Article XX of GATT and the Problem of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction : The Case of Trade measures for the Protection of Human Rights”,
Journal of World Trade 36 (2), 2002,the use of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties to justify extraterritorial application of human rights and environmental policies cannot be said to form intention of Members notwithstanding Article 3 (2) DSU
as this would be adding to rights and obligations of members.
53
See M. Fitzmaurice, “The Practical Workings of the Law of Treaties”, in M. Evans
(ed), International Law, Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 185-187
54
Interpretation of the Convention of 1919 Concerning Employment of Women During the Night, Advisory Opinion, 1932, PCIJ, Ser A/B, No. 50, p. 365
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survival of the government of the day in that country should not negate
the principle of pacta sunt servanda.55
Observations by other authors56 indicate that the Trade Stakeholder model is flawed in that Article XVI of the Marrakesh Agreement,57
paragraph 4 requires each member to ensure that their domestic laws
are in conformity with their obligations under the covered agreements.
Further it has been pointed out that the purpose of providing the security
and predictability under Article 3 (2) DSU was for all such stakeholders to regulate their affairs in accordance with the covered agreements.
The increasing influence of this model can be seen from an observation of similar-type cases over the years. In Tuna/Dolphin 1,58 the
United States (US) were not allowed to ban imports of Mexican tuna
based on the process used to catch the tuna as it did not affect the tuna
as a product. 59 The US claimed that Mexican fishermen failed to satisfy US authorities that the methods they used did not cause damage
to dolphins. In criticizing this ruling, supporters of the Trade Stakeholder model state that such import restrictions are not for protection
of domestic industry but for the protection of global common environment. If it were a global issue, then unilaterally imposing obligations on
Mexican fishermen would not seem to be a coherent method of solving
a global problem. Indeed, a global matter would require a global solution.60 Apart from the WTO, there are a number of specialized environVienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969.
J. Jackson, “International Law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports:Obligation
to Comply or Option to “Buy Out”?, Americal Journal International Law, 98 (109),
January 2004, p. 116
57
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation 1994
58
United States-Restriction on Import of Tuna (action brought by Mexico) report circulated but not adopted 1991, available at www.wto.org/tratop_e/envir_e/edis04_e.
htm as at 8.20 pm 16 August 2004
59
Article III (1), The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
60
M. Martin, “Child Labour in Developing Countries:- reasons and solutions”,A presentation at the SLSA Annual Conference, University of Striling, 2006. See also M.
Martin, “Child Labour: A Global Problem Requiring a Global solution”, a 4 part series
in the Sunday Citizen, Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, ISSN 0856-9754, 20 Jan 2008-10
Feb 2008, M. Martin “Child Labour, Parameters, Development Implications, Causes
and Consequences” Contemporary Social Science: Journal of the Academy of Social
Sciences Special Issue: Young People, Social Science Research and the Law Volume
8, Issue 2, 2013
55
56
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mental fora that provide a platform for discussion and agreement. This
of course would entail negotiating a global standard, not necessarily
an American one, but one that would entail negotiation and bargaining. Dismissing the US attempts to make its actions compatible with
its obligations under the WTO through Article XX (b), the panel stated
that in order for the exception to be operative, the test of necessity is to
show that all other less trade restrictive means of solving the problem
were exhausted. This included international cooperation. Interestingly,
no mention was made on the importance of the higher objective of the
WTO, namely the need to maintain a liberal trading regime.
In Tuna/Dolphin II61 the panel maintained the need to restrict the
unilateral imposition of US laws extraterritorially for inducing policy
changes in other countries, although changing the view of the use of
GATT 1994 Article XX (b) and (g) exceptions, stating that these could
be used for the protection of environment beyond domestic borders,
provided other less trade restrictive means were exhausted.
Promulgators of the Trade Stakeholder model are further confused
over the decision of Taxes on Automobiles.62 Although supporting the
approach of such cases on a case-by-case basis,63 the very fundamental
differences between the two Tuna cases and this one is missed. The
consideration in Taxes on Automobiles was that the “wasteful” act of
consuming higher fuel was occurring in the US. However, in Tunas I &
II, the “wasteful” act occurred outside the US. Therefore, the unilateral
extraterritorial application of US laws, in the case of Taxes on Automobiles did not occur. The decision would have been different if import
restrictions were placed by the US on, say, vegetables that were transported on a high fuel consuming trucks in another country.
The decision of Taxes on Automobiles must be distinguished from
that of Reformulated Gasoline.64 The US restricted the importation of
United States-Restriction on Import of Tuna (action brought by EC) report circulated but not adopted 16 July 1994, available at www.wto.org/tratop_e/envir_e/
edis05_e.htm as at 8.20 pm 16 August 2004
62
United States-Taxes on Automobiles, report circulated but not adopted 11 October1994, available at www.wto.org/tratop_e/envir_e/edis06_e.htm as at 8.20 pm 16
August 2004
63
M. Trebilcock and R. Howse, supra note 48, p. 413
64
United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS4/
61
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reformulated gasoline from Brazil and Venezuela, based on US environmental legislation. Although the panel held Article XX (b) exemptions
did not apply due to the lack of the US using the least trade-restrictive
means of achieving its environmental objective, and the AB stressing
that the chapeau of Article XX meant regard must be held to the rights
of both parties, the US claim failed due to lack of seeking cooperation
with foreign authorities in achieving environmental objectives. The difference between the two is that in Reformulated Gasoline, there was
clear discrimination in the calculation of baseline for emissions in favor
of US produce. Here, the underlying issue is clearly an attempted abuse
of the DSU to achieve public choice policy goals, and a blatant disregard of international obligations.
The implications of the consistency in attempts to manipulate negotiated rights and obligations through the “extended” approach became clear in Shrimp.65 The issue was the same, the unilateral imposition of US laws extraterritorially for inducing policy changes in
other countries. Interestingly, all of the above cases except for Tuna/
Dolphin II involved weaker, developing countries, which depend heavily on the US market. In Shrimp however, the US finally managed to
legitimize its illegitimate use of extraterritorial policy imposition. In
both instances, the panel and AB found the US to be in violation of
its WTO obligations. However, the manipulation of the constant insistence of past jurisprudence requiring the need for cooperation between
national authorities to satisfy US environmental concerns was finally
been achieved. It is unfortunate that the DSB did not enquire if the US
had attempted to initiate a multilateral turtle conservation programme
(the lesser trade restrictive measure accepted as a means of bringing its
measure into conformity) prior to the unilateral application of its WTO
inconsistent embargo on shrimp, as in Tuna/Dolphin I. Indeed the Malaysian delegation specifically stated that had the US been sincere in
its concern for sea turtles, it would have first sought the cooperation of
the Malaysian government with its requirement for turtle exclusion devises before imposing the embargo. In undertaking international obligations, such cooperation has to take place in a proper context, forum and
AB/R of 12 January 1995
65
United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products WTO
Doc WT/DS58/AB/R
235

Volume 13 Number 2 January 2016

Legitimising the illegitimate

with respect for national sovereignty to decide on undertaking treaty
obligations, based on its perception of the benefits that would accrue
from its rights and obligations under such a treaty. The final outcome of
Shrimp has compromised the sovereignty of all Members of the WTO
in allowing the use of international cooperation, subsequent to DSB
adoption of the AB report that the US measure was inconsistent with
its obligations, allowing the US to “bring its measure into conformity”
by legitimizing its measure that was found to be inconsistent with its
WTO obligations in the first place. Any attempt to rationalize this as a
lesser trade restrictive measure is misplaced. Some authors incorrectly
assert that such interpretation is unlikely to determine the substantive
outcome of a WTO dispute.66 Others place unnecessary emphasis on the
preparatory work and drafters’ intentions, with the mistaken belief that
these are sufficient to expand the WTO’s DSB mandate.67 Such an approach to interpretation has been held by other authors to be unstable.68
Further to assert that the WTO’s mandate is capable of being expanded
through this way is very misplaced. According to these authors, the AB
is able to expand the scope of Article XX GATT exceptions through
the application of the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties 1969 and
even have created a whole methodology on how this is to be achieved
in future,69 without addressing the fundamental question of whether the
AB has gone beyond its mandate in the first place and if such expansion
was what parties intended during negotiations. Other authors state that
this decision satisfies a public relations objective and that this was accomplished without seriously compromising the trade rights guaranteed
under the WTO Agreement.70 This contention is contrary to the rulebased approach where public relations has no place in the balance of
rights and obligations. This decision, notwithstanding its clear incom66

J. Pauwelyn, “How to Win a World Trade Organisation Dispute Settlement Based
on Non-World Trade Organisation law”, Journal of World Trade, 37 (6) 977-1030,
pp. 997-998
67
J. Hu, “The Role of International law in the Development of WTO Law” Journal
of International Economic law 7 (1) 143-167, Oxford University Press 2004, p. 150
68
A. McNair, The Law of Treaties, 2nd edition, Oxford university Press 1986, p. 421
69
P. Ala’i, “Free Trade or Sustainable Development? An Analysis of WTO Appellate
Body’s Shift to a More Balanced Approach to Trade Liberalisation”, 14 American
University International Law Review 1129, 1999, p. 1132-1169
70
A. Appleton “Shrimp/Turtle:Untangling the Nets”, Journal of International Economic law 2 (3) 477-496, 1999
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patibility with everything the WTO stands for, would render obsolete
the introduction of new issues into Ministerial Declarations and WTO
work programs. The diplomacy function of international trade relations
becomes redundant, and the rule-oriented approach becomes senseless,
and the entire security and predictability of the envisaged DSU of the
Punta Del Este Declaration is obliterated. As observed by some, the
over emphasis by the AB on interpretation in this regard has exceeded
its mandate. Rights and obligations as a result, are no longer derived
from the agreement but from the decision of the AB.71 In the above
case, such interpretation did indeed modify the meaning of compliance
and the objectives of Article 3 (7) DSU.
There is a view that the current slant of DSB decisions being declaratory72 in nature should continue to be applied.73 According to this view,
the ambiguity of such decisions is strategic, in that it is purposefully
unclear to bring parties to the negotiating table.74 The rational given is
that it allows Members to deliberate without outside interference where
parties could fashion the relief and the job of the decision maker is only
of legal interpretation rather than material remediation.75 Taking up this
point with regard to issues mentioned above,76 then it is not too safe
an avenue, due to the imbalance in economic power between Members
of the WTO. The place for such deliberations to fashion the relief for
the purposes of discussion so far under this view should be, and is provided for under Article 4 of the DSU consultations.77 This point further
emphasizes the reasons for the weaknesses in the consultative process,
as Members, usually the more powerful of the two would benefit more
D. Mc. Rea, supra note 28, p. 6
As opposed to corrective orders
73
C. Carmody, “Remedies and Conformity Under the WTO Agreement”, Journal
of International Economic Law (2002) pp. 307-326. See also M. Bronckers, “Better
Rules for a New Millennium : A Warning Against Undemocratic Developments in the
WTO”, Journal of International Economic Law (1999), pp. 547-566
74
C. Carmody, Ibid
75
Ibid.
76
Regarding the matters that influence the decisions of a country to participate in a
DSP.
77
Japan and EC submissions TN/DS/W/32 and TN/DS/W/38 in Table I, are criticized
as the DSU provides sufficient avenue for consultations within the dispute settlement
process. Additional consultations would eat away at the already sensitive issue of the
duration of a dispute settlement process.
71
72
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from delaying the discussions to the last stage of the dispute settlement
process, whilst continuing the application of the inconsistent measure.
Furthermore, in the context of the WTO, where representation is governmental and the right to participate as third parties is not automatic,78
the environment is quite secure from outside interference during negotiations.
The declaratory view draws it support in the WTO from the use of
the plural “recommendations” of Article 19 (1) and (2) of the DSU,
suggesting that a panel might make more than one recommendation. It
supports its strategic theory from the use of bringing the measures “into
conformity” in that “conformity” is ambiguous enough to achieve the
objective of strategic ambiguity.
According to this approach, to achieve compliance of the wrongdoer rather than correction of the plaintiff’s injury, would seek to prohibit
the reinstitution of an offending measure, but not forbid measures of
equivalent effect, provided they are implemented in a WTO-consistent
manner.79 In US Superfund,80 a case involving a tax differential on petroleum products refined in the US, the panel explained that the respondent had three remedial options and that it was not the role of the panel
to dictate any particular one. Accordingly, the three options included
lowering the tax on foreign-refined crude or raising the tax on domestic
crude or harmonizing the rate applicable to both domestic and foreign
refined at some third point.81 Given the GATT’s objective of lowering
trade barriers, the panel should have noted the three options but recommended the best one in line with the objectives and sprit of the WTO
Agreement. The ability to make suggestions on how to bring measures
into conformity with WTO rules is a powerful tool that should be used
more often.82 Some authors have proposed that Panels should make

78

Article 10 DSU
Chi Carmody, supra note 73
80
United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances BISD 34th
Supp 136 (17 June 1987)
81
C. Carmody, supra note 73
82
J. Pauwelyn, “Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO : Rules are rulesToward a more collective approach” The American Journal of International Law,
April 2000, 94 A.J.I.L. 335
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more use of their prevailing power83 to suggest specific measure for
implementing WTO dispute settlement decisions. Respondents’ taking
the suggested implementing measure would benefit from a legal presumption of WTO consistency and would dispense with the problems
and concerns the “extended” approach has caused, which in turn would
create greater faith and participation in the system by all Members.84
In settling a dispute under the WTO, Article 3 of the DSU speaks
of a “satisfactory settlement of the matter” and to a “solution mutually acceptable to parties to a dispute and consistent with the covered
agreements” with the view of providing security and predictability to
the multilateral trading system. The outcome of the Shrimp85 applying
the concept of strategic ambiguity satisfied neither of these objectives.
The outcome of the case could be seen as a legitimisation of unilateralism, and would further contribute to the exclusion of weaker members
in participating in dispute settlement procedures due to the increased
uncertainty. The contention that implementation in the Shrimp case is a
multilateral concern and that it illustrates that compliance will probably
go far beyond the original complainants to involve all those interested
in supplying the relevant market86 is flawed for a number of reasons.
Firstly, the negotiation of a multilateral turtle conservation agreement
should not be made a criterion for conformity as the WTO offers the forum to initiate new multilateral agreements, and the DSU as an avenue
to do so is incorrect. The effect of allowing this interpretation of conformity also impeaches on the sovereignty of a Member nation in interfering with its choice of whether to agree to negotiate a new endeavor.
Further, as in this case87, the pressure by environmental lobbyist was the
driving force to the US administration enforcing a law that was in existence for some time but never applied extraterritorially for obvious reasons.88 Secondly, Members conduct themselves based on negotiations
Article 19 (1) DSU
E. Petersmann, “WTO Negotiators Meet Academics; The Negotiations on Improvements of the WTO Dispute Settlement System” Journal of International Economic
Law (2003),
85
United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products WTO
Doc WT/DS58/AB/R
86
C. Carmody, supra note 73
87
s. 601 of the US Endangered Species Act
88
Paragraph 2 (a) of the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round
83
84
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already concluded. Accepting negotiations on a separated agreement as
part of conformity is akin to asking members to negotiate on something
where negotiations have already concluded and rights and obligations
already exist, ignoring the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda in public
international law and disrupting the already existing negotiated balance
of rights and obligations.89 The fact that the complainant’s persistent
assertion that the negotiation of a multilateral turtle conservation agreement and the conformity obligations of the US for the case at hand
were separate issues, sacrifices the main aims of the DSU90 in favour
of strategic ambiguity. Thirdly it puts market access (for the complainant) in a worst position then before the new negotiations and the burden
of obligations are operationalized before an agreement is reached. It
ignores the issue of intentions of parties when adopting the agreement.
In the Shrimp case, the better approach, it is submitted was for the
panel or Appellate Body to make a clear, definitive decision whether
the measure was either consistent, and if it were not, recommend its
withdrawal, as in Article 3 (7). The ambiguity of “bringing into conformity” and the subsequent qualification by the Article 21 (5) panel that
the proposed negotiation of a multilateral turtle conservation agreement
was sufficient conformity in the light of the surrounding circumstances
of persistent objection and the manner the embargo was initiated in the
first place creates extreme uncertainty in the DSU.
The Article 21 (5) panel in this case referred to the good faith efforts to reach a multilateral agreement as satisfied and compliance was
deemed justified.91 The US government never approached the Malaysian Government before instituting the shrimp embargo. It only referred
to the multilateral turtle conservation agreement after the finding of the
Appellate Body in the original action. The Malaysian government’s response before and during the Article 21 (5) panel proceeding was that
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations encumbers upon members to have submitted the
WTO Agreement to their respective authorities for approval, therefore ideally there
should never be such an application of a domestic law extraterritorially in violation
of WTO rules.
89
S. Charnovitz, “Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions”, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 95, No. 4 (Oct., 2001) pp. 792-832
90
Article 3 (6) DSU
91
WT/DS58/RW
Volume 13 Number 2 January 2016

240

Jurnal Hukum Internasional

compliance and the proposed multilateral shrimping agreement were
separate and distinct issues. The manner in which the panel was able to
read good faith from this adds even greater uncertainty and increases
developing country lack of faith the DSU. According to some authors’
Malaysia’s ability to demand another Article 21 (5) panel is open-ended
and that WTO conformity by the US may be reassessed at any time.92
It is submitted, that for a developing country that has had to endure an
embargo in excess of seven years, it is highly unlikely that Malaysia
would seek another Article 21 (5) panel unlike Canada in the case of
Brazil-Aircraft,93 for at least two reasons. Firstly it might be circumspect of what the panel will rule as in the first instance, and secondly
there has been irreparable damage to its shrimping industry. The impact
of the 21 (5) panel report was also to indirectly to create a reasonable
period of time in perpetuity. Time can never run out as long as there is
good faith efforts, the impact of such rulings are very obviously outside
the competence of the DSU. It has been held that there are three key
features that sets the WTO DSU apart from the rest. One of these is its
ability to render binding decisions.94 Binding decisions that are ambiguous enough to accommodate the declaratory view, it is submitted, is not
worth the financial and political costs for a weaker nation to be willing
to utilise the dispute settlement system.
Article 3 (1) states that the DSU contains the principles for the
management of disputes applied under Articles XXII and XXIII of the
GATT 1994. Article 3 (2) states that the WTO dispute settlement system
is a central element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system95 and the DSB though its recommendations and
rulings cannot add or diminish the rights and obligations of members
provided in the covered agreements. Article 3 (3) recognizes that the
prompt settlement of situations in which a Member considers that any
benefits accruing to it directly or indirectly under the covered agreements are being impaired by measures taken by another Member is es92

J. Kearns and S. Charnovitz, “Adjudicating Compliance in the WTO : A Review of
DSU Article 21.5”, Journal of International Economic Law, (2002)
93
Brazil-Export Financing Programme for Aircraft WTO Doc WT/DS46/ARB
94
B. McGivern, “Seeking Compliance With WTO Rulings on Globalisation”, 36 The
International Lawyer 141, Spring 2002
95
Indeed an effective and credible DSM is pivotal to the success of any agreement.
See M. Martin, supra note 1
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sential to the effective functioning of the WTO and the maintenance of
a proper balance between the rights and obligations of Members. DSB
decisions are aimed at achieving a satisfactory settlement of matters in
accordance with rights and obligations under the Understanding and
covered agreements.96 The aim of the DSM is to secure a positive solution to a dispute.97
Article 3 (7) of the DSU sets out a hierarchy of four methods of
implementation of DSB decisions98:
i. a mutually acceptable solution, which is clearly to be preferred;
ii. in the absence of a mutually acceptable solution, is usually the withdrawal of the measure concerned;
iii. if immediate withdrawal of the measure concerned is impractical
parties should agree on compensation as a temporary measure;
iv. as a last resort, the possibility of suspending the application of concessions or other obligations on a discriminatory basis vis a vis the
failing Member, subject to authorization of the DSB.
II. CONCLUSION
Therefore the DSU and Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994
seek to provide a balanced approach to the settlement of disputes
through firstly, consultations to achieve a mutually acceptable solution
as envisaged by article 3 (7), and failing a settlement/solution, a mechanism that provides transparent, prompt, equitable and positive conclusion through the panel and appellate processes. Central to this is that
such decisions of the DSB must be confined to matters related to in the
covered agreements to which the WTO DSU is guardian. This conclusion is arrived at from the emphasis placed on the covered agreements
in Article 3 (2) – (9) and 3. (11) and (12), and Article 1 (1) which cites
Appendix 1 as containing a list of covered agreements to which the
WTO DSU will apply. This therefore makes it unequivocally clear that
the WTO DSU cannot concern itself with matters not arising from or
Article 3 (4) DSU
Article 3 (7) DSU
98
A. Rosas, “Implementation and Enforcement of WTO Dispute Settlement Findings:
An EU Perspective, Journal of International Economic Law (2001) ,pp 131-144
96
97
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having anything to do with the agreements mentioned in Appendix 1.
The impact of the Article 21 (5) Panel on what compliance entails in
Shrimp, has damaged the DSU as it has created uncertainty from what
is to be expected from a dispute settlement proceeding. The uncertainty,
in turn affects the credibility and stability of the system. The economic
and political cost of participating in a dispute, especially when the complainant is a developing country and the respondent a powerful developed member is clear. When the DSM does not create an environment
for a weaker country to pursue its rights due to the instability of the
system, it will cause members to pot for alternative means of steeling
disputes. This when relating to parties of unequal economic and political power reverts the system to a power-based as opposed to a rule
based one, undoing everything the WTO was meant to achieve.
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